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I
 
 
Synopsis 
 
In 2003 the Norwegian government launched an action plan for a comprehensive innovation 
policy. Although Norway has had a satisfactory economic development, there is still room for 
improvement in the innovative area. The process of developing a comprehensive innovation 
policy was initiated after various pressures. Today, however, there is little activity in this 
political area. Following, the action plan can be considered a failure when it comes to 
initiating coherent, coordinated and horizontal innovation policies. This paper will discuss the 
various factors that might have contributed to this failure. These are knowledge and a 
common understanding of innovation policy, path dependencies, inertia and coalitions within 
government, government instruments for policy learning and political leadership. It further 
emphasizes that lack of anchoring of the plan can explain the failure of the Norwegian action 
plan for a comprehensive innovation policy. 
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1.0 Introduction 
During the 1980`s and 1990`s innovation as a phenomenon was recognized as the decisive x- 
factor of future growth and welfare (Fagerberg, 2005, p.3). In the same period, knowledge 
has become the key input factor of our society, making our economy knowledge intensive. 
This gives us, both as citizens, policy- makers and scholars, new challenges and new 
opportunities as we have to influence future growth and welfare in new ways. Further, the 
task is complicated by the most common broad and all- embracing definition of innovation. 
Innovation is defined as new processes, new organizational models, new products or the 
combination of old ones in a new way. This means that innovation is everything that 
represents something new and can improve processes or products in a way that can generate 
economic benefits at some direct or indirect level (Fagerberg, 2005, p.4-8).  
As a consequence of this acknowledgement, researchers have tried to expand the 
understanding of the innovation process to find out what influences firms and societies 
innovative capabilities. An area of research that has been particularly influential is the 
systemic approach to innovation. In an innovation system, all elements that might contribute 
to or reduce the innovative capabilities of a given area or sector are included (Lundvall, 1992, 
p.5). The important processes are the interactions between the different elements in the 
system. The main components of the system are organizations and institutions. Organizations 
are formal structures that are consciously created and have an explicit purpose (Edquist, 
2005, p.188).  Institutions are sets of common habits, norms, routines, established practises, 
rules or laws that regulate the relations and interactions between individuals, groups and 
organisation (ibid.).  Policy and governance structures represent both organizations and 
institutions in this system.  
Although the systemic approach to innovation represented a new way of 
understanding innovations processes, this new understanding treated the government 
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dimension as a black box. This has changed during the expansion of the systemic approach 
and government is today seen as a crucial element for improving a nations innovation 
system. As the world becomes more dynamic, open and globalized, governance and 
institutional relationships becomes increasingly important when it comes to foster innovative 
activities. Government and governance structures are very important factors as they are in the 
position to influence many of the other elements in the innovation system.  Following, policy- 
makers regionally, nationally and in international organizations have tried to break this down 
into direct policy efforts in order to improve the interactions between the different elements 
in their innovation systems. Innovation, as a systemic phenomena, indicates that innovation 
policy have to be comprehensive, horizontal and cross- sectoral (OECD, 2005a, p.9).  
However, although policy and governance structures are considered to be important 
elements of innovation systems, little work and research has been done on the governmental 
processes influencing new policies and practices in his area. This can be due to many things. 
First, innovation policy is not a theoretical area, but an area of practices. National varieties 
must be taken into account. Hence different countries must develop individual policies. 
Second, there is not sufficient knowledge on what an innovation policy should contain as 
direct policy efforts. Third, different views on what innovation is and what scope it leaves for 
policy action can give inconsistent policy efforts that have limited or no effects. 
Despite these difficulties many countries have due to various pressures initiated new 
processes creating and implementing their own innovation policy. Almost all western 
countries have challenges at maintaining high growth rates and reduce unemployment, as 
they at the same time face large increases in welfare expenses and increased competition 
from countries with low- wages and marginal public expenses. This challenge has, together 
with increasing external pressures, created sufficient incentives to initiate national innovation 
policies (EU, 2006, p. 11-13). Unfortunately few of these efforts have been successful 
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(OECD, 2005a, OECD, 2005b). However, these changes are very recent and might not be 
visible yet.  
In this paper I want to look at the Norwegian attempt at creating a new governance 
tool for innovation policy. More specifically, this will include the development and the 
implementation of From Idea to Value in 2003, the governments action plan for a coherent 
innovation policy (Ministry of Trade and Industry, 2003). OECD (2005a, 2005b) has done an 
analysis of national efforts through the MONIT1 project. Their conclusions were that Norway 
met many difficulties in executing a unified innovation policy strategy because of structural 
and institutional barriers within government (Remøe, 2005, p.217). They also stressed the 
need for broader knowledge bases within the area of innovation policy and identified many 
underlying tensions in the Norwegian institutional system that influenced the work with 
innovation policy in a negative way (Remøe, 2005, p.227). In this thesis I want to analyze the 
process of bringing about the governmental action plan for innovation policy and study 
obstacles to the development and implementation of a comprehensive innovation policy in 
Norway.  
The Norwegian initiative from 2003 is no longer on the political agenda and although 
the plan was characterized as a first step, little follow up work or processes has been initiated 
except from a state of the art report in 2005 (Ministry of Trade and Industry, 2005). Several 
questions arise from this. To what degree was the Norwegian effort to change their 
innovation policy was a failure and why did it fail? What internal or external obstacles are 
there to implement such changes? Are there processes and institutional settings within the 
bureaucracy that have contributed to this failure? Or is it the political leadership in the 
responsible ministries that has failed? Can there be dysfunctional learning systems within in 
the bureaucracy and government failing to feed back policy deficiencies to policy makers?
                                                
1 Monitoring and Implementing National Innovation Policies (MONIT) 
  
4
 
 
 The structure in this paper is as following. First I will present my case, the Norwegian 
plan for a coherent innovation policy, from Idea to Value.  In chapter three, I will present 
my research question and the theoretical basis of a third generation innovation policy as 
well as the different theoretical approaches that can bring more knowledge into these 
processes. From these I will derive some hypothesis I will use in my discussion in chapter 
four. At the end of chapter three I will present my methods. In chapter four, I will analyze 
and discuss these hypotheses together with my empirical data and presented theory. In 
chapter five I will link the different hypothesis together and present my discussion and 
conclusions. Finally in chapter six I will present some implications for policy and suggestions 
for further research.   
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2.0 From Idea to Value  a Comprehensive Innovation Policy Plan for Norway  
2.1 The Initiative 
The initiative was first presented in the Governments research committee where the Minister 
of Research and Education, Kristin Clemet launched the idea of a comprehensive innovation 
policy. A group of State Secretaries from the Ministry of Research and Education, the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry and The Ministry of Local Government and Regional 
Development were gathered to plan the process. The main responsibility was given to the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry who lead the process afterwards. Originally, the plan was 
more an initiative towards entrepreneurs and start up companies in order to support their 
work as inventors and innovators. This was extended as government saw the need to develop 
a more comprehensive innovation policy.  
The pressure came on the one hand from inter-governmental organizations like the 
OECD and EU, from research milieus as NIFU STEP2 and from politicians and other 
stakeholders who saw the importance of developing a more coherent innovation policy. On 
the other hand, the challenges popularly referred to as the sharks jaw the increasing gap 
between future income from the oil and gas sector and adversely increasing welfare expenses, 
created pressure to secure future industries in a global competition (Ministry of Trade and 
Industry, 2003, p.9). This acknowledgement made many national stakeholders, especially in 
the political realm of society; realize that creating incentives towards increasing firms and 
societies innovative capabilities were the main presupposition for future growth and welfare. 
This contributed to release the sufficient willpower in government to initiate such policy 
changes. After a period of malfunctioning industry policy with much direct support to sector 
industries and companies and government attempts at creating clusters3, there was a vacuum 
                                                
2 NIFU STEP is the leading Norwegian research institute for studies in innovation, research, and education 
(http://english.nifustep.no) 
3 Attempts partly supported by the political environment as IT Fornebu, (Hernes, 1998) 
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to be filled in the area of industry policy. The initiation and implementation of an innovation 
policy would contribute to fill this space.  
  
2.2 The Process of Making a Comprehensive Innovation Policy  
The government decided that this was to be launched as an action plan. However, this way of 
work does not demand the usual ex ante evaluations with external actors that are required 
with for instance white papers. There were some limited hearings with other government 
agencies like Innovation Norway4, the Norwegian Research Council5 and SIVA6, but there 
are opposing views on how well this was integrated in the development of the plan. The 
process started in 2002 and the action plan was presented in 2003.   
The actual writing was done by a cross- ministerial group of mid level bureaucrats 
who were put together in order to work out a common ground for innovation policy. 
Ministries represented were the Ministry of Trade and Industry, the Ministry of Local 
Government and Regional Development and the Ministry of Education and Research. Their 
mandate was to work out a common definition of innovation, highlighting important policy 
areas for innovation policy and agreeing on efforts to be initiated as instruments of the action 
plan. This required a great deal of coordination between the Ministries. Although they did not 
participate in the working groups, the document was signed by the Ministry of Agriculture 
and the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy as well.  
After the presentation of the plan, a large conference with different stakeholders was 
held, promoting innovation policy as one of the main political efforts in policies for 
sustainable development, growth and future welfare. At this point the plan was addressed as a 
                                                
4 Innovation Norway promotes nationwide industrial development profitable to both the business economy and 
Norways national economy (www.innovasjonnorge.no) 
5 The Norwegian Research Council is the national actor for coordinating research efforts and funding (www. 
forskningsradet.no )  
6SIVA builds networks between regional, national and international R&D (research and development) 
environments (www.siva.no). 
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first step as the dimensions of the plan were large and the efforts suggested were seen as 
inadequate by many in relation to what innovation policy should contain.  
 
2.3 Content and Efforts of the Action Plan  
From Idea to Value identified five main policy areas that were important for innovation in 
Norway. These areas were:  
• The improvement of general framework conditions for industry  
• The improvement of knowledge and competence in firms and society  
• Increased efforts in research and development  
• The improvement of entrepreneurship policies and the conditions for start- up 
companies  
• The improvement of different infrastructures  
Within these areas several efforts were launched in order to promote innovation. In the area 
of framework conditions for industries legislation on competition, public purchase policies, 
tax systems, improving the recruitment and use of workforce, a user friendly public sector 
and a simplification of public regulations were listed as high priority areas. In the area of 
knowledge and competence these were improvement in education to promote internationally 
competitive levels of knowledge, strengthen the natural sciences, creating incentives for 
lifelong learning and improving the knowledge flows between industry and knowledge 
institutions. The third area was research and development, where the top goal was to reach 
the OECD level of R&D, 3 % to R&D of GDP. Other goals were to increase the quality and 
degree of internationalization of Norwegian research, strengthen the relationship between 
research institutions and industries to improve industry R&D, and work to commercialize 
more results from research. In the area of entrepreneurship these efforts were listed; 
implementation of entrepreneurship as method in schools and other education, make it easier 
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to start new companies, increase the direct public efforts to small and medium sized 
enterprises, to entrepreneurs and young firms as well as risk reduction in early stages for 
start- up companies. The final area is infrastructure. The most important efforts are to develop 
a safe, effective and environmentally friendly infrastructure in the whole country, develop 
good, secure and simple E- solutions for signatures, payment solutions and communication 
(Ministry of Trade and Industry, 2003, p.16-38).  
 However, many of these efforts were already part of other policy areas and on their 
way to be implemented. In order to initiate something new and truly cross- sectoral from the 
plan, nine geographically or industry specific projects were initiated to detect barriers to 
innovation and use this knowledge to improve a region or sectors innovative capabilities. 
These were:  
• Maritime development, MARUT  
• Commercialization of research results  
• Innovation in the northern regions 
• Inland 2010  
• Successful transitions in industry  
• Big city development (main capital and regional centers)  
• Innovation in private services  
• Innovation in public services  
• Naval development  
Source: (Ministry of Trade and Industry, 2005, p. 32-40).  
The projects were placed in six different ministries. These projects had a limited time frame 
although some have been continued by the responsible ministries. 
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2.4 Organizational Implications  
On the organizational level the main goal was to create working methods that makes a 
development of an effective, dynamic and coherent innovation policy possible. The concrete 
efforts in this area can be separated into two dimensions, one on the top decision- maker level 
and one more fundamental for the way ministries work.  
On the top level it was established a Governments innovations committee, this 
consisted of nine Ministers. The Governments innovation forum consisted of stakeholders 
from unions, industry and other important actors in addition to the Ministers. Within the 
bureaucracy new organizational practices and routines for cross- ministerial work were to be 
established. There were also a cross- sectoral group of mid level bureaucrats who were set to 
cooperate on policy matters in this area.  
For the working practices in the ministries there were established goals to improve 
learning practices within the ministries. To do this the establishment of result-oriented goals 
to promote evaluation and learning within government practices was central in addition to 
making structures more flexible and decentralized (Ministry of Trade and Industry, 2003, p. 
15). 
 
2.5 Budgetary Implications  
In the Norwegian plan for a holistic innovation policy, no new concrete economic obligations 
were made (Ministry of Trade and Development, 2003). The responsible ministries got no 
extra funding and were expected to find resources to this work within their own budgetary 
framework. The exception was the nine projects as they received extra funding. However this 
was limited to each project and for further funding, each ministry had to find funds within 
their own budgets. 
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2.6 The Degree of Change from Previous Policy 
Reports and evaluations of the Norwegian Innovation policy (Remøe, 2005, Grønning, 2006) 
claim that changes in Norwegian innovation policy have been minimal after 2003. The plan 
did not include the most important elements of an innovation policy, as most of the 
suggestions were sectoral and not a result of a preliminary work with an innovation policy 
but rather a summarization of policy areas important for innovation. According to my 
informants, many of the suggestions were established as parts of other policy areas which 
were already on their way of being implemented. To their defense, the responsible Ministers 
presented this as a first step towards a coherent innovation policy. However there has been 
little follow up of these promises except from a state of the art report on innovation policy in 
the autumn 2005, were all areas from 2003 were listed with indicators of how far they were in 
fulfilling each goal (Ministry of Trade and Industry, 2005, p. 23-26). However, innovation 
policy is not on the governments agenda today.    
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3.0 Conceptual Framework  
3.1 Research Question 
When assessing the efforts and actions following the Norwegian action plan for a 
comprehensive innovation policy, these efforts can be considered a failure when compared to 
the intended goals. Despite good intensions the process failed somewhere along the way. It is 
therefore interesting, both academically and politically, to find out why this happened and 
which mechanisms that strengthens and reduces these factors. Findings can be useful not only 
for Norwegian stakeholders, but also for others who wish to implement coherent policies in 
similar regimes. My research question in this paper is:  
 
Why did the initiation and implementation of a comprehensive innovation policy in 
Norway fail?  
 
The focus will mainly be on internal causes and I will analyze the interplay between the 
different elements in the process and see how they have influenced the work with a 
Norwegian Innovation policy. 
 
3.2 A Third Generation Innovation Policy 
The main goal for an innovation policy is to give incentives to and release the innovative 
potential in a region or country. This is a challenging task for governments. Modern 
innovation policy sees government and governance in a new way, giving them a larger and 
more active, and in some ways a decisive part to play in the process of improving a nations 
innovative capability.  
Innovation policy has developed in many stages through the years. The first period, 
from after the Second World War until about the 1980s, represented a linear understanding 
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of innovation and technological development as their basis for policy, making direct efforts in 
the research area its most important goal. The linear understanding of innovation sees the 
process of technological development as an automatic process from basic research, to applied 
research, to development work and finally as a product demanded by the marked. The notion 
of innovative activity as linear and automatic made the policy efforts input oriented. An 
increase in research funding and a strengthening of the science communities became the 
presupposition for the creation of new technology. Following this way of thinking, policy- 
makers implemented these efforts in their policies towards research and higher education 
(Remøe, 2005, p.220).  
The second period or generation of innovation policy from about the 1980s until the 
end of the 1990s, had a deeper understanding of innovations as a base. Innovative processes 
were at the time seen as interactions between the different elements in the innovative system. 
The feedback mechanisms and the knowledge flows between these elements were perceived 
as a crucial precondition for innovation. The goal of policy in this period was to strengthen 
the feedback mechanisms between the different elements (Grønning, 2006, p. 23- 25). 
However these developments in the understanding of innovation processes did not include 
governance structures. 
Around the millennium several countries made attempts at implementing what is 
referred to as a third generation innovation policy. This is an even broader understanding of 
innovation policy. It includes all policy areas, institutions and sectors that are of importance 
to innovation as well as taking the government dimension more seriously (Remøe, 2005, 
p.221). More specifically a third generation innovation policy include general framework 
conditions as tax systems, regulations, laws influencing firms behavior, labor marked, 
educational systems, welfare arrangements, transport and infrastructure. Innovation policy is 
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to increase the governments ability to release the innovative potential of all other sectors 
(OECD, 2005a, p.9).  
These are all policy domains that can contribute to reduce or improve a nations 
innovative potential. Innovation policy is in many ways structure policy, its aim is to improve 
and strengthen structures in order to make them become flexible, dynamic and adaptable 
when facing a continually changing environment. This need for flexibility and dynamic 
ability also has to be apparent in policy areas, which influence innovation. To use a recent 
Norwegian example, a large cellulose factory, Union, was decided shut down in 2006. This 
happened in the end of the national election campaign in 2005, politicians from all parties 
cried for action, but they could do anything to influence the decision. At the last day of 
production the majority of the work force had gotten new jobs or offers of jobs elsewhere in 
the same company (www.norskeskog.com ). This shows the adaptive ness of the Norwegian 
labor marked. This is both due to less rigid protection of the employees than they for instance 
have in Germany, and the high level of education in Norway that indicates high learning 
capacity and therefore an ability to adjust to new opportunities.  
How you define innovation policy is important in relation to both which policy areas 
you include and how that policy should be executed. The neo- classical view of economics 
traditionally has one rationale of what the scope for public policies are, while the 
evolutionary economics has another. The main difference is the argument for why public 
intervention is needed; the neo classical economics sees problems in innovation systems as 
market failure while evolutionary economics sees it as a system failure (Good NIP, 2003, p.4-
6). 
These two understandings call for different solutions and have different understanding 
of the need and scope for policy actions. Market failure is the assumption that firms in 
marked economies systematically will under invest in R&D because knowledge is expensive 
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to develop, but easy and cheap to distribute. As a result of this firms will not be able to keep 
enough surpluses from their R&D activity and will therefore under invest in R&D. The scope 
for policy is therefore actions that encourages discovery- oriented activities and protects the 
use of the results (Smith, 1999, p.22-23). This can be policies as R&D funding and protection 
of intellectual property legislation. The problem with this assumption is that it does neither 
say where policy action should be located nor say how much policy is needed.  
System failure includes failures in infrastructural provision and investment, 
transition failures, lock- in failures and institutional failures (Smith, 1999, p. 40). This implies 
that innovation not only is influenced by marked forces but by the entire innovation system. 
The basic function of systemic innovation policies is to facilitate for innovation opportunities 
by building an innovation infrastructure (Good NIP, 2003, p. 6).   
In the public discourse on innovation policy misunderstanding founded in these 
different perceptions of innovation and the scope for public policy, often result in a 
centrifugal debate were the main line of conflict is between whether we should have a pro- 
active or neutral industry policy. The first side focuses on industry specific conditions, while 
the second focuses on the general framework conditions. However, none of these positions is 
connected to innovation policy. Innovation policy is not about protecting dying industries 
or sectors, and it can never be neutral or passive as it is a complex mix of policy areas that 
affects innovative processes. It requires active and deliberate policy choices that strengthen a 
societys ability to adjust and build dynamic and flexible structure to enhance these 
mechanisms. The Norwegian policy debate has also been influenced by these misunderstood 
divergent views. The created conflict between active and less active industry policy, makes 
policy changes in these areas more difficult as the debate becomes polarized.  
A shift to a third generation innovation policy represents a major change in the way of 
thinking and prioritizing for government, ministries, public agencies and other stakeholders. 
  
15
 
 
Former responsibilities can shift through other ways of working both internally within an 
organization and in collaboration with other agencies. This can present certain difficulties as 
tensions between the new and the established can arise. Other potential tensions can be short 
term budgetary implications, conflicting views on the implications of innovation policy, 
strategic challenges connected to labor divisions, agencies and the organizational set up of 
government (OECD, 2005a, p. 9). As a large and cross- sectoral policy area, innovation 
policy has to include these features:  
• Coherence in policy which imply that all suggested policy efforts have to be 
supportive, i.e. not in conflict with each other  in order to avoid policy with 
competing rationales.  
• Policy has to be horizontal in its approach as it covers many different policy 
areas and crosses many boundaries between traditional policy areas.  
• Policy has to be coordinated to ensure common understanding and to direct 
efforts effectively.  
Source: (OECD, 2005a, Good NIP, 2003). 
 
Innovation policy documents have especially stressed certain areas that are important to the 
successful creation of a modern innovation policy.  
• Coordination between and within agencies to balance imperatives and to find 
mutually supportive policies.  
• Create common visions and strategies to improve policy integration and to 
overcome internal tensions.  
• Make action plans with proper evaluation, monitoring and reporting systems 
and make learning an integrated part of government practices.  
• Improve knowledge bases of all involved organizations.  
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• Improve and clarify the division of labor between government agencies.  
• To create balanced public- private sector interfaces for policy and actions  
Source: (OECD, 2005a, p 14- 16). 
 
The Norwegian action plan for a comprehensive innovation policy was an attempt to develop 
a third generation innovation policy in Norway.  
 
3.3 The Underlying Reason for Failure  
 I will now present my main hypothesis for why the process of implementing a coherent 
innovation policy in Norway failed.   
 
The action plan for a comprehensive innovation policy failed because it was not sufficiently 
deeply rooted in the ministries and other stakeholders because there was a lack of knowledge 
and distinct criteria for what a coherent innovation policy would imply for policy and 
government action.   
 
3.4 Knowledge and Learning as the Basis for Innovative Activity 
The area of innovation policy is as I have mentioned earlier theoretically connected to the 
systems of innovations approach. An important part of innovation systems is therefore policy 
and governance structures, how they work and how they effect innovation. Policy and 
government efforts is the only way policy makers have a chance at making improvements and 
changes in the innovation system, and should therefore be used wisely in order to secure a 
nations future growth and welfare.  
The increased focus on innovation and innovation systems is connected to the 
knowledge intensification of our economy. The foundation of innovation theory is 
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knowledge, because the knowledge embedded in persons, between persons and in 
organizations is the presupposition for all types of innovations. The main feature of a 
knowledge economy is that the main resource or capital of production in the economy is 
knowledge (Castells, 1996, p. 17). The rapidly growing service sector is an example of this. 
The world is changing fast and is more open and dynamic than before. This makes 
knowledge the key ingredient to both using and taking advantage of new possibilities.  
Knowledge is the result of learning processes in interaction with other people or 
organizations (Lundvall, 1992, p.1). It is characterized as being cumulative and though 
expensive to invent, overall cheap to produce and distribute (Parayil, 2005, p. 9). Knowledge 
and learning are becoming increasingly important for the ability to secure growth and future 
welfare. This increases the importance of understanding innovation processes and the 
mechanisms that influence these processes.  
Assuming that knowledge is the key resource in modern economy, learning becomes 
the most important process. It is in the innovation system learning takes place and where 
knowledge is created and diffused (Lundvall, 1992, p. 1-2). This means that the diffusion of 
new and old knowledge, i.e. distributed innovations, is dependent on a well functioning 
innovation system. It is within this conceptual framework I write this paper. Innovation 
policy is a way of readjusting policy, bureaucracy and government agencies to this new 
reality. It is also about changing organizations and their mind sets in order to improve their 
capabilities in this area. Their dynamic and flexible ability will be decisive for how well they 
can manage new possibilities and challenges in the knowledge economy. 
From my observation of the status quo of Norwegian innovation policy and the 
literature on innovation policy, I will now present theories I believe are of particular 
importance to the development of, and difficulties met, in the work with a coherent 
innovation policy in Norway.  
  
18
 
 
3.4.1 Bureaucracy and Organizational Change 
There is much literature from many theoretical directions on the behavior of and the 
mechanisms of organizational change. In this paper, my main focus is directed to public 
organizations and the bureaucracy in particular. I will now give a brief introduction of 
bureaucracy, presenting its common features and aims.  
Weber saw the modern bureaucracy as a statement of formal rationality, a provider of 
stabile political conditions for both citizens and industry in spite of changes in the political 
landscape (Østerud, 2003, p. 66). Over the years, dysfunctions within the bureaucratic 
organizational model have been pointed out. Among these are the influence of personal 
ambitions, rigidity, inertia, and the claim of bounded rationality. Bounded rationality is the 
opposition to rationality theories of human behavior. It opposes the idea that one actor can 
know all consequences of a given choice and be able to choose the most optimal decision 
every time (Simon, 1945). Transferred to organizations this means that the different parts of 
an organization can act differently and inconsistent due to different interests and uncertainty 
about means- ends connections (Hannan and Freeman, 1984, p.151).  
Following this, the bureaucracy is not a unified actor. It is influenced by the diversity 
of its own elements, its own history and limited resources. Their actions will not always be 
the most optimal or wanted solution (Østerud, 2003, p.68). This assumptions, together with 
the in some areas large prospects for independent action from the bureaucracy, makes the 
bureaucracy an independent actor with influence on political decisions (Østerud, 2003, p. 73). 
It is in this respect the bureaucracy becomes such an important actor and influence in my case 
study.   
Another important contribution to understand the dynamics of public action is the 
decision- making theories. There are two main rivaling theories of decision-making theory. 
These are exchange- and institutional theories, where the first is based on rational actors who 
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negotiate forward agreements without any friction. These results are believed to be the most 
optimal ones as there could be no other result that would not be worse for one part. This is the 
principle of pareto- optimality7. The latter model is based on a more organized anarchy, using 
March and Olsens garbage can model of decision making as an example (March and Olsen, 
1976). It assumes that decisions do not follow certain logics, and that many different 
elements in the decision- making process can change the direction of a decision. They also 
see decision- making processes as potentially conflicted and that make them open processes 
with open- ended solutions (ibid.). This theory presumes that problems, solutions and 
decision-makers interact constantly and it is in these interactions they couple and make new 
connections. In another time or place the given problem could have been overlooked or 
solved differently. 
 In this paper I believe the latter theory can contribute to see the work with a coherent 
innovation policy in Norway in another way. When connecting this model to Simons 
bounded rationality and the inner life of bureaucracy, they can inspire many interesting 
discussions of what happened in the process of making a comprehensive innovation policy in 
Norway.  
 
3.4.2 Path Dependency and Inertia in Organizations  
Innovation theorists have proven that in the process of developing an innovation system, 
history counts (Wicken, 2005, p.1). This is particularly connected to path- dependency 
literature. Path dependency can be explained as a self- reinforcing process where 
organizations, technologies or other units are so influenced by their own history that their 
actions and priorities becomes a part of a path (ibid). We can see this materialized when 
organizations or institutions repeatedly chooses related solutions, priorities or tasks over long 
                                                
7 Pareto- optimality is a situation where no other options can be better if it does not become worse for one party. 
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periods of time. Being path dependent can be strong point as it helps to keep focus, but there 
is also a risk that they can get locked in a certain path, making choices sub- optimal and 
unable to change direction (Dicken, 2003, p. 24). Rigidity can be a result of such ongoing 
processes.  
In organizations and politics this can be materialized as opposition to change new 
priorities and policy areas as they may be in conflict with established paths. As actions and 
priorities are embedded in the system or organization it can be very difficult to change these 
paths. Many of the proposed policy changes in the plan for a comprehensive innovation 
policy in Norway were not very different from old policy efforts, and did not suggest many 
untraditional policy choices. This supports the path dependency argument. However, theories 
of path dependency do not exclude the possibility that paths can change or adjust. New paths 
are created, but the main challenge is to manage these changes before lock- in appears and 
negatively impacts decisions and directions.   
 Together with path dependency, inertia is one potential reason to why change in 
public sector can be slow and/or reluctant. Hannan and Freeman (1984) writes that structural 
inertia is a dynamic phenomenon and an organizations degree of inertia can change from 
environment to environment. Structural inertia must be defined in relative and dynamic 
terms; an organization has high inertia when the environmental conditions change more 
rapidly than the organization manages to keep up with environmental changes (Hannan et al. 
1984, p. 151). During their research Hannan and Freeman (1984) found several mechanisms 
that re-enforces inertia. Reliability, accountability and reproducibility are highly valued 
competencies in organizations and also work as selection mechanisms. Reliability is the 
ability to produce a collective product with a given quality repeatedly. Accountability is the 
ability to rationally account for their actions. Reproducibility is the ability to reproduce its 
own structure in order to be reproducible and accountable (Hannan and Freeman, 1984, p. 
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153-154). This theory assumes that society has certain selection mechanisms that favor 
certain features. These selection mechanisms have a tendency of choosing the features that 
coincide with the features of inertia. This is again re-enforced with age, size and complexity 
of an organization (Hannan and Freeman, 1984, p 157- 162).  
This theory does not claim that organizational change is impossible, only that it have 
to be gradual and limited. However, there are ways to reduce the impact of inertia; this is 
where learning, in our case policy learning, can contribute to make organizational change 
become a smoother operation. The Norwegian bureaucracy is an old and complex 
organization with large and diverse responsibilities. Different internal forces can be opposed 
to changes and change can therefore meet adversity.  From this I draw the following sub- 
hypothesis: 
 
1. The obstacles met in the process of executing a coherent innovation policy are due to path 
dependency and inertia in the bureaucracy. 
 
3.4.3 Policy Learning 
Policy learning is to develop new and relevant knowledge about own efforts and feed this 
information back into the organization, the bureaucracy and the political environment. In 
many ways, an organizations ability to learn from its own actions and surroundings is an 
organizations ability to innovate. Policy learning is regarded as one of the prime 
preconditions for governments being able to develop and execute a well functioning 
innovation policy (OECD, 2005a, p.69). Learning can be separated into two different 
processes, knowledge acquisition (know how or learning by using) and knowledge 
development (learning by doing) (Burton- Jones, 1999, p. 7). Knowledge acquisition is for 
example to be able to use a computer, knowing how to program it, is knowledge 
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development.  Knowledge is transferred both between people and organizations. That makes 
the absorptive capacity of persons and organizations important. Absorptive capacity is the 
ability to detect and adopt knowledge outside of you or your organization and use it for 
internal purposes (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990, p. 128).  
Kline and Rosenberg (1986) have proposed a model they call the chain- link model to 
explain the innovation cycle. This model can be related to learning in organizations and 
policy learning. The main argument for Kline and Rosenberg is that all processes and actors 
who are involved in the innovation process or in this case, the innovation policy process, are 
mutually dependent on each other and the feedback system they share. Without proper 
instruments for knowledge sharing and acquisition of new knowledge these feedback 
mechanisms will fail (Kline and Rosenberg, 1986, p.290). To be able to fully exploit the 
learning benefits, an organizations ability to develop this into new and applicable knowledge 
is crucial. The increased knowledge intensification of society makes these processes more 
important than earlier.  
There are many instruments for improving the learning ability of an organization. 
Organization and management researchers have studied the specific challenges of managing 
innovation and improving the knowledge creation and development of organizations. They 
have found working methods they believe improve an organizations ability to invent and 
innovate. The most relevant working methods for this thesis is strategic rotation, autonomous 
self- organizing teams, culture for good criticisms (Nonaka, 1991, p.102, Van de Ven, 1986, 
p.600), and good evaluation practices with specific attention to both ex ante and ex post 
evaluation (OECD, 2005a, p.69). Strategic rotation is to shift the composition of work groups 
to constantly challenge established routines, priorities and paths. This can help to develop a 
common understanding of problems and solutions that again can reduce conflicts and reduce 
existing internal divisions. Self- organizing teams can be effective at releasing unknown 
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potential, out of the box solutions of new tasks that can increase the adoptability of new 
thinking and reduce the traditional perceptions of doing things. The establishments of an open 
culture where criticism is a natural and accepted part of the routines is important in order to 
improve work.  
Evaluation practices are particularly important in the public sector. These evaluations 
can be both ex ante, before the final political product is to be approved, and ex post, after 
implementations in order to ensure that goals were attained. Although the action plan 
contained direct organizational goals to increase the learning ability in the Ministry, few 
efforts have been launched in this area. Organizations in charge of innovation policy should 
have good routines for learning and evaluation and good practices for the absorption of 
knowledge from outside the organization. From these arguments I suggest the following 
hypothesis:        
 
2. Incentives and routines for policy learning have not been properly implemented within the 
ministries.  
 
3.4.4 The Role of Coalitions in Organizations  
Another related organizational theory that can contribute to explain the challenges of 
implementing new policy and organizational changes are the theories of dominant coalitions 
first held by Cyert and March (1963). It assumes that individuals in an organization have their 
own goals or preferences they wish to implement. These individuals have to cooperate with 
others who have preferences in the same direction in order to reach their goals. Together, 
these individuals and groups of individuals will constitute a coalition. A coalition can have its 
basis in common education, ideology, mind sets, department, sub units, identities and so fort, 
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that can rival about goal setting, power and positions within the same organizational 
structures (Scott, 2003, p. 296).  
One coalition is usually dominant over other coalitions although these coalitions can 
shift over time due to changes in priorities, leadership, recruitment policies or a coalitions 
work to get in a dominant position. In large complex organizations there can be dominating 
coalitions in each sub unit who can compete against each other in the organization as a 
whole. These conflicts are in some organizations very obvious, in others almost not apparent 
at all (Scott, 2003, p. 297). The organizing of an organization can have a large influence on 
the degree of conflicting opposing coalitions that an organization can represent. Some 
structures enhance these conflicts, while others reduce them. Leaders, internal division of 
power and external stakeholders are important factors influencing this. Organizational 
processes that can contribute to the reduction or strengthening of these conflicts are 
recruitment policies, socialization processes within organizations and advancement policies 
within the organization (Østerud, 2003, p.68). This can present alternative explanations on 
my case as it can explain how those previous discussions influenced the final outcome of my 
case. Remøe (2005) has pointed out several tensions between different coalitions within the 
Norwegian ministries that complicate the process of initiating a comprehensive innovation 
policy (Remøe, 2005, p.227). This can be materialized in the following hypothesis: 
 
3. Different coalitions within the ministries can have contributed to reducing the degree of 
change and impact in the innovation policy area due to opposing interest. 
 
3.4.5 The Importance of Leadership                 
As mentioned earlier, changes in leadership can shift or reduce power constellations in 
organizations. This demands strong leadership with clear visions and ability to gather 
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different opinions in important strategic choices. Van de Ven (1986) claims that leadership is 
critical in creating a cultural context that fosters commitment, enthusiasm, common visions 
and innovation (Van de Ven, 1986, p.602). This demands a supportive leadership, where the 
leader has a particular responsibility in periods of change. A leaders main responsibility is to 
define the institutions mission, embodying purpose into the organizations structure and 
systems, defending the institutions integrity and ordering internal conflict (ibid). These 
responsibilities can be transferred to the organizational changes in government when they are 
changing their working methods to manage new policy areas. In my case there was a shift of 
Minister in the middle of the period that could have had a negative influence on this process. 
Large, comprehensive change demand visions, insight and ability to work with a long time 
perspective. A change in leadership might have been disturbing for the process and reduced 
the impact of the initiative. As I mentioned above, leaders can have a great impact on the 
different coalitions within the ministries. I am also going to bring this dimension of 
leadership into my discussion. From this I suggest the following hypothesis. 
 
4. Political leaders failed to execute long term, visionary leadership and did not manage to 
unite opposing interests within the ministries. 
 
Now I have presented different theoretical foundations and hypothesis and theories I will use 
as a base to discuss my case in chapter 4.0. 
 
3.5 Methodology 
Methods are how we proceed to find the best answers to a given approach to a problem. 
I will use a qualitative approach in this thesis. I will use interviews as a main source of 
empirical evidence together with secondary literature and official documents. This is a case 
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study of the process of developing and implementing one policy document, the Norwegian 
action plan for a comprehensive innovation policy. Gerring (2004) argues that a case study is 
defined as an intensive study of a single unit. The aim is to generalise across a larger set of 
units from the one case. The case study approach where employed in order to achieve 
detailed information on the process of developing and implementing a comprehensive 
innovation policy in Norway and further to generalise from these findings. Due to the nature 
of a case study, ambiguity is to a certain degree inherent. The informants will give their 
subjective perception of the case and an objective representation of the different forces 
influencing the process and implementation on a coherent innovation policy is therefore 
difficult. 
 
3.5.1 The Interviews 
Before conducting any interviews, I made an interview guide where I made questions that 
pointed to the different factors I believed to be of importance for the failure of the action 
plan. I also asked about their perceptions of the changes in the innovation policy area. The 
interviews where semi-structured and had open-ended questions. The interview guide also 
contained questions about academic background and prior work experiences, to get a nuanced 
picture of the persons interviewed. The interview guide did not require any large revisions 
after I started conducting interviews. During the interviews I did not use a tape recorder; I 
only referred the interviews by writing notes. All of the interviews were confidential and no 
one of the interviewees will be quoted by name in this paper. The interviews took 
approximately one hour.  
In the selection of my interviewees I focused on their position in the process with the 
plan as I wanted to get the different opinions from stakeholders involved. I wanted to 
interview most high- ranking officials as they often have a broader knowledge of such 
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processes. I selected different organizations I knew are important in the work with innovation 
policy to get their opinions on the matter. I also got very helpful support from my supervisor 
who gave me many suggestions on interview objects in different organizations who had been 
important in the process with the action plan and in its aftermath. As I started conducting my 
interviews, many informants gave me new names they thought could bring new knowledge to 
my thesis. I have also been in specific contact with the Ministry of Trade and Industry and 
got interviews with many different officials there. Because I have used from Idea to Value 
as my case and the ownership of this action plan was in the Ministry of Trade and Industry I 
had additional questions for them about internal procedures and routines. The interviewees 
mostly supported each others claims and statements, when corrected from position and 
workplace.   
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4.0 Explaining Failure 
The theories presented above give many possible explanations for why the plan for a 
comprehensive innovation policy in Norway can have failed, both in its making and 
implementation phase. I will now discuss these theories up against my empirical findings and 
see which ones that can contribute as explanatory factors.  
 
4.1 Knowledge and Structure as Explanatory Factors  
I will first discuss my main hypothesis, namely that the reason for failure was lack of 
knowledge about the contents of a third generation innovation policy which led to a lack of 
anchoring within relevant organizations. These difficulties are not only Norwegian 
challenges. Many western countries struggle to create their own innovation policies that 
include tailor-made and effective efforts to improve their innovative capability. This demands 
a deep knowledge and understanding of innovation policy on the one hand, and about a 
nations innovation system on the other. In this section I will look more into 
•   The lack of knowledge and common understanding about innovation policy as a 
reason for failure 
•    Governmental structures enhancing these deficiencies 
  
The OECD has pointed out that the knowledge base for innovation policy in most European 
countries, its contents and implementation is unsatisfactory (OECD, 2005a, p.15). Since we 
can talk about a European wide lack of common agreement and understanding on the 
contents of a coherent innovation policy one can argue that the Norwegian efforts has been 
rather successful, only by being able to make a sense of wholeness with their policy. Many 
stakeholders have during interviews emphasized the attempt in it self as a success as it made 
many ministries work together on a common policy area. On the other hand, this does not 
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equal to having a successful innovation policy. There are also many examples of countries 
who have managed to implement third generation innovation policies although they might not 
be successful on all areas (OECD, 2005b).  
 It can also be discussed how common this understanding of innovation policy was, and 
also, is. The interviewees all gave a broad definition of innovation and innovation policy, but 
they were still far from being coherent. Very few managed to point out concrete policy efforts 
that were coherent, cross- sectoral and could improve the innovative capabilities of the 
Norwegian innovation system. I believe I can use this as an indication of the degree of 
common understanding of innovation policy between the organizations they represent. These 
differing views are apparent in the different ministries, government agencies and political 
parties.  
 As many of the informants pointed out, policies are still sectoral and it is difficult to 
make connections and cooperate across established boundaries. This can indicate a limited 
common understanding of innovation policy on the top level in organizations and this reduces 
the ability for the lower levels to change their practices. However, this entire process was a 
rather top- down initiative so the resistance to change might as well be established structures 
working to preserve status quo.  
 Another important factor influencing the lack of knowledge is the short time used on 
preparations for the action plan. One informant pointed out that less than a year was spent on 
it, leaving little time for the acquisition of new knowledge and the translation of existing 
general knowledge about innovation policy into policy specific knowledge. The short time 
period can also have limited the possible degree of common understanding between involved 
stakeholders. Although some informants said that they were using time on working out 
common definitions and understandings, the interviews show that this understanding did not 
go very deep. Using enough time to develop this common understanding could have made the 
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implementation process easier as it had removed many obstacles between different actors and 
interests. This indicates lack of learning routines in the ministries and lack of knowledge on 
how one should anchor changes within organizations. I will discuss this more in chapter 4.3.       
 These different explanations are reinforces by the divided responsibilities between the 
ministries on the one hand and the outsourcing of policy implementation in own 
organizations on the other. The tradition for segmentation is strong in the Norwegian 
bureaucracy and these structures have been reinforced as the new public management reforms 
of public sector have been implemented (Remøe, 2005, p.229). The separation of 
implementation and planning of policy and the increased independence of these agencies 
have made it difficult to execute policy across established borders because of fragmentation 
in government (Ministry of Administration and Government Reform, 2003, p.19).  
 Remøe (2005) has argued that this fragmentation of government is the main barrier to 
implement a coherent innovation policy. This makes it difficult to deeply anchor new policy 
and ways of thinking in all areas of government. Many of the informants especially pointed 
out the difficulties with the strong sectoral principle and the difficulties this especially 
represented for the necessary coordination of the different policy areas. This was also evident 
in the process of making the action plan.  
 One informant said that the lack of a leading Ministry, with the sufficient power to 
force other ministries to change their priorities, was one of the main reasons for why the 
plan failed. In the Norwegian political system, the only minister in position to control others 
is the Prime Minister, and to some degree the Minister of Finance. Many informants 
suggested that the process would have become strengthen if the Prime Minister had been the 
responsible Minister. This implies the importance of leadership I will discuss this more 
thoroughly later in my discussion.  
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Due to both fragmentation and time aspects, stakeholders outside government to some 
degree felt disregarded in the process. There is very diverging views on the involvement of 
external actors. One informant said that from the outside the process looked as it was 
supposed to be an internal one and not connected with the other actors in the innovation 
system. Some informants said they were thoroughly included while others said they were left 
out of the process. Regardless of this inconsistency, this is an indication that the process was 
not sufficiently anchored as there can be so diverging opinions on the same matter. This lack 
of anchoring of other stakeholders is problematic for the common understanding of 
innovation policy and to the implementation process.  
 Another important group of stakeholders were lack of anchoring have had undesirable 
results is in the political opposition. This is today evident as the change of government in 
2005 set the final end to the implementation of a comprehensive innovation policy in 
Norway. Although there were little ideological resistance and disagreement towards the 
action plan, the ideas and visions behind it did not become part of the opposing political 
parties understanding of value creating policies. It is especially important in minority 
governments to sufficiently anchor their long term policy in other political parties. This is 
because minority governments are more vulnerable to rapid political changes and they should 
therefore ensure the durability of policy and efforts by anchoring it deeply in other political 
parties. 
This discussion has presented us with relatively strong indications of a lack of both 
relevant knowledge and anchoring. These shortcomings could be enhanced by forces of 
inertia and path- dependency, political leaders and strong dominant coalitions and policy 
learning. I will discuss these additional explanations in the next chapters.  
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4.2 Path Dependency and Inertia in Policy and Practices 
Norwegian policy and parliamentary practices have over the last forty years made both the 
need for and the power of the bureaucracy stronger due to a tradition of minority and 
coalition governments. Frequent changes in governments and/ or partly overrule by the 
parliament have made the development and implementation of policy more dependent upon 
the competencies of bureaucracy. Policy actions and efforts are influenced by prior priorities. 
This can be good as the collective memory and knowledge in an organization can contribute 
to improve new efforts. However it can also hinder new thinking and changes in policy. In 
this case, path dependency can be materialized in direct policy efforts, working methods, in 
the mindsets of individuals or in the culture or different cultures within an organization. In 
this section I will look at: 
• The degree history and prior decisions have influenced the process and 
implementation of the action plan 
• To what degree internal forces may have contributed to the failure of the action plan 
 
From my interviewees I got indications that history to some degree has influenced the process 
of making a coherent innovation policy. This is especially evident in the plan itself where 
many of the efforts were very sectoral and already established parts of other related policy 
areas. One informant claimed the plan was a Manifestation of the sectoral policy principle in 
Norway. The Norwegian bureaucracy is traditionally divided into strong and independent 
ministries. It does not matter if the intentions were cross- sectoral and an intended 
superstructure for other related policy areas when the result continues to be sectoral.  
However, due to Norwegian government structures a shift in the division of labor 
between ministries would require a structural reform, not only new policy efforts. On the 
other hand, other countries with the same ministerial structure have managed to make well- 
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functioning cross- sectoral policies within exiting boundaries, as the have in Finland. They 
have a government council of science and technology led by the Prime Minister and has the 
strategic, long- term responsibility for making coherent policy in areas important to the 
Finnish innovative capability (www.minedu.fi ). The comparable Norwegian government 
council only met a couple of times without any specific results. This might be because of 
many other reasons than path dependency, although the way of doing things may have 
affected the work at this level as one informant pointed out.  
 An argument against path dependency is the novelties following the plan. Several 
informants have pointed out the novelty in the process, like that fact that three ministries 
cooperate and present a common action plan and commit to co-ordinate their policy with 
other policy areas. This is a shift in policy planning and work in Norway and is therefore not 
in favor of the path dependency argument. One informant also said that the agreement of a 
common definition and understanding of innovation and innovation mechanisms is a valuable 
change. Path dependent mechanisms would have slowed down or stopped this process. 
However, as I have mentioned earlier, these changes have had limited effect and can 
therefore not justify a total disregard of path dependency as a contributing factor.    
 History and tradition will always play an important part in the making of new policy. 
It is however difficult to present any example off path dependency in action, although it 
seems clear that it was present. Path dependencies can also be materialized or strengthen 
through other mechanisms in an organization. Leadership, learning and coalitions can be 
influenced by path dependent structures. Another related force that can contribute to path 
dependency in organization is structural inertia.  
Inertia can be explained as different forces within and between organizations. In this 
case the ministries worked to push development in different directions. An informant said 
that the traditional boundaries within the ministries still are influential. Genuine cooperation 
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across these boundaries can be difficult. The Norwegian ministries are large, complex and old 
organizations; as Hannan and Freeman (1984) argued in their paper, this can be an indicator 
of a high level of inertia. Is this the reason why the Norwegian efforts at creating a 
comprehensive innovation policy had limited effects? If we assume that Norwegian 
ministries have a high level of inertia, change would have to be slow and gradual (Hannan 
and Freeman, 1984, p.151). If we look more closely at our case, it can be a just claim that the 
entire process was rushed through the system. Several of my informants commented the short 
period of time this process was carried out. Approximately one year was used on 
preparations, making it difficult to include and cooperate with all interested parties in the 
process.  
The plan in it self is not very old, three years in public sector is not a long time to 
implement such broad and fundamental changes, making the time aspect a possible reason 
why very little change is traceable. Although some of the informants presented this as a 
possible explanation, others put more emphasis on the plan and its efforts in it self, claiming 
that the efforts suggested were insufficient in reaching the goals for a comprehensive 
innovation policy.  
The main problem today is the complete lack of focus on innovation policy in the 
political debate and in the work of government. This can be due to two main reasons. First, 
the preparatory work was insufficient and the follow- up work is therefore difficult to 
implement. This will be discussed in chapter 4.3. Second, the preparatory work and the plan 
were influenced by forces reluctant to make these changes, making it difficult, unnecessary 
and pointless to continue a process without the necessary means. Some informants gave 
indications of the latter claiming that the opposing forces to the concepts and ideas of 
innovation policy worked to make the plan as harmless as possible. Considering that the 
plan did not include fresh funding and that many of the efforts were established parts of other 
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policy areas, facts supports this claim. However, these actions might not be deliberate, but are 
consequences of the action of individuals who work towards own goals. This can be an 
example of the bounded rationality of both individuals and organizations.     
Politics is about making priorities between different policy areas. Due to limited 
resources, increased efforts in one area will ultimately lead to a reduced effort in another. 
This is also the case in the innovation policy area. The managers of other policy areas can 
therefore be in opposition to new potential rivaling projects in fear of competition over the 
same means. This can also be a reason for the lack of budgetary anchoring as it makes new 
policy harmless to already established policy areas. This will be further discussed in chapter 
4.4. 
In the process of slowing down or hindering change, forces of inertia can work 
together with forces of path dependency and reinforce each other. In this case, inertia as the 
rigidity in an organization can be seen as apparent. This is however not a one-sided negative 
quality. One informant emphasized the importance of a well- functioning bureaucracy that 
resisted radical changes as this is a protection against sudden upheaval. There is on the other 
hand a middle way between the two. The dangers of path dependent lock- in and an absolute 
resistance to change should be met with strong and committed leadership and a consensus on 
the main goals and targets. These are factors that have to be in place in order to reduce 
inertial forces when new policy areas are to be executed. I will elaborate this in chapter 4.5.      
 
4.3 Organizing for Policy Learning 
During my interviews I have found much support for my thesis that there is a lack of policy 
learning and reflection on the effects of organizing within the ministries. There is little 
interaction between departments within ministries and between ministries. Modest interaction 
and poor communication between people with different backgrounds and identities, can lead 
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to many different understandings of policy methods and directions. Many of the informants 
also emphasized this during the interviews. In this section I will look more closely at: 
• The routines and organizational settings for creating common language, i.e. a 
common understanding of innovation policy 
• The composition of employees to strengthen the development of a common 
understanding of innovation policy 
• The implementation of new organizational working methods 
• The governments system for learning and evaluation 
 
On of the main goals when initiating a new, cross-sectoral policy area is to develop a united 
understanding of what this area contains. I have got diverging evidence on this subject. Many 
informants claim that the united and common understanding of innovation policy is one of 
the successes of the document, while others said that this agreement is worth little as long as 
the efforts following it were so limited. The diverging definitions presented by the informants 
also contradict this. If we put emphasis on the importance of establishing a common language 
or understanding, agreeing on the same text may not be sufficient as people with different 
academic, cultural and professional background can put different meanings into the same 
sentence. This does not however make them agree more on the subject matter, the 
disagreement is only postponed.  
To ensure an actual agreement and common understanding on content, Nonaka (1991) 
has recommended organizational methods as strategic rotation between departments and 
teams, autonomous self- organizing teams and the importance of employing people with 
different backgrounds and also mixed backgrounds (Nonaka, 1991, p.102-104). Recruitment 
policy is an important aspect here. During my interviews I found that a strategic recruitment 
of people with different backgrounds was more or less absent in the Ministry of Trade and 
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Industry, although they stressed the need for a basic economic understanding as a criteria for 
hiring new personnel. These practices have been criticized by some informants as being 
biased in favor of a traditional economic understanding of policy. I will elaborate more on 
this tension in the next chapter.   
 Diversity in the capabilities of new and old employees can contribute to change 
organizations socialization behavior and reduce the homogenization new employees can go 
through when changing workplace (ibid, Østerud, 2003, p. 68). This can reduce boundaries 
between parts of an organization and contribute to the development of a common language or 
understanding between all elements in an organization. According to some of the 
interviewees, the working atmosphere between the three ministries improved and they 
developed a common understanding of innovation policy. However, the same informants also 
reflected on that this effect might be limited to the people who had been active participants in 
the process. If this is correct, the attempt to encourage more cross sectoral work and 
understanding between ministries also failed.  
 One informant said that the Ministry of Trade and Industry did not have explicit 
practices to reduce established boundaries. As a precondition for learning, the establishment 
of a flexible organization should be included as a part of the work with making the Ministry a 
learning knowledge organization. During my interviews I found that the organizational goals 
towards the Ministry itself were under prioritized from the beginning. However, some 
informants told me that each department within the Ministry of Trade and Industry had got 
more freedom in organizing themselves. This is a positive development, although this 
freedom had not revolutionized the way of work in any department. Path dependency and 
inertia can be forces contributing to this. The increased flexibility is the only visible effort of 
the organizational goals from the plan. Little emphasis on this work indicates an 
underestimation of the importance of organizing in order to achieve certain effects. Although 
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the implementation of learning mechanisms failed to be an ongoing part of the work, the 
process with the plan was perceived in it self as policy learning by its participants. Many 
informants expressed that the process had been educational for the participants. 
A second organizational goal was to develop new working methods to ensure and 
improve the Ministry of Trade and Industry as a learning and knowledge organization. The 
increased freedom for department in organizing themselves has however not led to better 
learning practices according to an informant. The development of a knowledge organization 
where learning and flexibility are central features demands focus from its managers and a will 
to act and change an organization in this direction. No one of the informants could point to 
any such changes within the Ministry.     
Following from Idea to Value there were established a cross ministerial working 
group to ensure that the different ministries were coordinated. According to an informant, this 
was not an easy task. One of the reasons he suggests might be a too week anchoring in the 
respective ministries, as well as too little understanding and support at the top bureaucratic 
level. According to other informants there is no work with this cross- sectoral cooperation at 
the moment. In addition, the different policy efforts from the action plan were, as I have 
written earlier, sectoral, making it less important to have a well functioning cross- ministerial 
understanding and coordination of the work. Due to the traditional independent Norwegian 
ministries, this is not surprising (Remøe, 2005, p.224). This can also be an expression of path 
dependency as they were unable to create new cross- ministerial goals and policy in the 
process with initiating a horizontal innovation policy.  
A third goal and effort to improve the learning ability of the ministries was the 
creation of evaluation systems. Good evaluation systems ensure the feedback mechanisms 
that are important to improve the knowledge flows into an organization. Learning is 
dependent on these structures.  A system for evaluation of goal attainment was one of these 
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goals. The creation of such systems has been supported especially by the Confederation of 
Norwegian Enterprises in order to make policy and policy efforts more examinable, and to be 
able to improve policy. According to informants, this work has stagnated within the 
ministries, although many other public agencies use these methods as an instrument to 
improve their performance. From my interviews I have found that this was never a top 
priority for the Ministry of Trade and Industry and is today no longer on the agenda.  
An important input to the innovation policy management process is the ability to 
evaluate and learn from these evaluations (OECD, 2005, p.69). Emphasis is especially put on 
the use of ex post evaluations to measure consequences and goal attainment, but also the use 
of ex ante evaluations, to obtain sufficient knowledge bases of the policy area in question. 
We can use the Norwegian process of creating an innovation policy as an example in it self. 
After internal government deliberation, it was decided to present the new effort on innovation 
policy as a government action plan. A decision to make it a white paper or to put down a 
public committee to make a report to parliament (NOU) would have made the process prior 
to the launch of a comprehensive innovation policy better rooted in stakeholders outside the 
ministries. White papers or reports to parliament have rules for hearings; involvement from 
external actors and the period of time they have to be open for input. This would have 
required a larger knowledge base of the Norwegian innovation system, both its strengths and 
weaknesses, and would perhaps have given a different recipe than the current for what an 
innovation policy would imply. These different document processes also demand more 
thorough political processes in Parliament; this could have contributed to a better anchoring 
in other political parties and reduced the vulnerability of the plan as governments shift.    
The final area where the Ministry of Trade and Industry was expected to initiate 
organizational changes was on the collaborative work between other ministries and other 
external stakeholders. Many informants said that today, these relationships are dependent on 
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personal acquaintances and common background. Informants from organizations outside the 
ministry were for the mostly not satisfied with their degree of involvement in the process 
with the action plan. There are very divergent views on the degree of cooperation with 
external actors. Organizations outside the ministries seem to think they were overheard and 
ignored, while the ministries thought the process had been very including when it came to 
third parties. This indicates poor communication between parties and lack of well- 
functioning routines for such involvement.  
Government agencies outside the ministries were, according to my informants, 
slightly bettered involved in the work although they also stressed the importance of personal 
relations. This witness a lack of involvement routines and different perceptions on what 
involvement includes. This reinforces the need for improved policy in this area. On the other 
hand almost everybody had the same perceptions of the process of developing the action plan 
and the reason for failure. This can indicate a better involvement and anchoring process than 
what is perceived by the informants.  
The work with making policy more horizontal and cooperative has been neglected 
since 2003. As we can see, most of the efforts in this area have not been implemented. This 
makes the organizational part of these policy changes difficult, as the executing agency does 
not have the appropriate means to develop and implement a comprehensive innovation 
policy.   
 
4.4 Policy- a Result of Rivaling Coalitions? 
Some informants claim that there are different educationally based coalitions within and 
between ministries. These conflicts are especially present in the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry. These coalitions have their basis in education and a common understanding of the 
rationale for policy actions. This is connected to the different argument for policy actions 
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using either a market or systemic failure argument I presented in chapter 3.2. This is among 
other things visualized in the fact that over 50 % of the bureaucrats in the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry have an economic education, indicating their common perception of these 
arguments. This tension is also apparent in other government institutions but at different 
degrees. Informants from other government agencies also witnessed these different coalitions 
within their own organizations. These informants also put forward the healthy implications of 
such differing perceptions as it made the organization more dynamic. In this section I will 
discuss the 
• The nature and dynamic of coalitions 
• The ideologically and territorially rooted coalitions in the ministries 
  
These coalitions can as I presented in 3.4.4 shift and change composition. An informant 
emphasized that this coalition was not always dominant and suppressing of other coalitions, 
but that it is the economists who decides when there is a conflict of interest. Another 
informant said that this influence of economics and the resistance to become directly 
involved in policy efforts goes way back. It is in the walls of the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry one informant said. This also gives the path dependency argument more weight. 
Informants participating in the process with the development of a comprehensive innovation 
policy said that the participants had decided that the theoretical conflict between innovation 
studies and more classical economics was artificially constructed. They worked under the 
interpretation that the two directions were supplementary rather than mutually exclusive. 
However, despite this agreement the interested parties could have worked to push their own 
views forward.     
Remøe (2005) has pointed out several opposing coalitions within the ministry of trade 
and industry and between the different ministries in his study of Norwegian innovation policy 
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(Remøe, 2005, p. 227- 228). These conflicts follow at least two dimensions, one ideological 
as I have partly discussed above, and one territorial.  
  During my interviews I got opposing opinions on weather there was a real or 
constructed conflict between the different views on the rationale for policy actions to improve 
a nations innovative capabilities. Some informants claimed that this conflict was dominant 
and that they permeate all relevant policy areas. Others claim that this conflict is overstated 
and constructed. They saw convergence between the theories and claim that they complement 
each other more than they are rivals. As it is difficult to draw unified conclusions from these 
opposite claims, I have tried to see how this conflict can be apparent in policy and practice.  
As I have written above, among the employees in the Ministry of Trade and Industry, 
roughly 50 % have an economic background, while the rest are a mixture of different 
academic backgrounds. The responsibility for the plan was placed in the economic policy 
department, making them able to influence both its mandate and content. One informant said 
that because of this influence eventual effects of the plan were reduced to a minimum before 
the plan was launched, making it meaningless to continue work. This indicates the large 
influence different coalitions can have had in the process.   
An informant said that the economists in the Ministry of Trade and Industry holds 
most leadership positions and have emphasis on recruiting and placing their people 
strategically in the different departments within the ministry. Other informants point to the 
fact that the common mind set between the economists in the different ministries reinforces 
this particular perception of policy and what policies should contain. I will elaborate this 
further in chapter 4.6. 
There are several factors that can influence the role and power of coalitions. Leaders 
are very important, and can together with power divisions and the influence of external 
stakeholders contribute to shift dominating coalitions (Scott, 2003, p 298- 303). The 
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influence of coalitions can also be connected to the decision- making models. Since the 
nature of coalitions is dynamic, a decision- making process that includes these unknown 
consequences serves better to explain the process of working out a coherent Norwegian 
innovation policy. This can be an explanation for why the results of the plan got a different 
result than intended from the initiators and policy- makers.     
The territorial conflict is based on position and placement within the organizational 
structure. Although being a sectoral bureaucracy, Norwegian ministries can be given tasks 
crossing these sectoral boarders. We can use the Ministry of Trade and Industry as an 
example; this is the Ministry with the main responsibility to ensure the nations value creation. 
However, we also have own ministries for Petroleum and Energy, Agriculture and Food, and 
Fisheries and Costal Affairs who also are industries and therefore the executers of policies 
within these policy areas. In addition, from an innovation perspective, the main responsibility 
for research is in the Ministry for Education and Research and the ownership of the 
Innovation Norway and SIVA is primarily in the Ministry of Local Government and Regional 
Development because of its rural implications. This is not necessarily negative, but it 
complicates the role of the coordinating Ministry when so much responsibility and 
competencies are placed in other ministries. As relatively autonomous and independent 
ministries one informant said that Everybody wants to coordinate everybody. This has led 
to difficulties in the cooperative work between ministries as the division of power can lead to 
conflicts between territorially based coalitions within different ministries.  
To avoid such potential conflicts, strong leaders are required to set the policy agenda 
and make the necessary changes to ensure their role as a coordinator. A leader can influence 
different coalitions and their dominance. A strong leader can be able to shift power coalitions 
or reduce their significance if he manages to unite them in sharing common visions and 
strategies. On the other hand a week leader can risk to be overrun by the dominant coalition, 
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becoming a hostage for their priorities (Scott, 2003, p.298). The implications of leadership 
will be more thoroughly discussed in the next chapter.  
 
4.5 Strong Leadership- a Precondition for Change  
This process has according to informants been a top down process from the beginning, 
making leadership important both as a contributing factor to the plan, but also as a reason for 
its failure. OECD (2005a) has presented strong and visionary leadership as an important 
success factor to be able to implement a coherent innovation policy that would otherwise be 
difficult to justify (OECD, 2005a, p.68). This makes the executed leadership in this period 
important. In this section I will discuss: 
• The consequences of the frequent changes of minister in the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry 
• The importance of strong and visionary leadership 
• The position of the Minister of Trade and Industry compared to other ministers 
 
There was a change in Minister in 2004 where Børge Brende replaced Ansgar Gabrielsen. 
They are both from the conservative party but had different qualities for managing innovation 
policy. An informant said that while Gabrielsen had been a part of the entire process Brende 
had to get familiar with the policy area and work, and did not have the same ownership to the 
process as his predecessor. In the autumn 2005, shortly before the entire governments 
departure due to the elections, Brende issued a state of the art report on the different efforts 
from the action plan from 2003 (Ministry of Trade and Industry, 2005). After the new center- 
left government entered the ministries, the entire plan has been replaced by a different 
approach to broad value creating policy. An informant said that although they were 
continuing many of the same efforts as under the previous government, it is now referred to 
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as an active industry policy, not as innovation policy. This is not surprising. As one informant 
said, No minister proceeds with the former ministers policies when he is recently elected. 
However, there has been great consensus between most political parties in the area of 
innovation policy, so there is no political reason for the decision not to continue the work 
with the plan. A different explanation for this can be a lack of understanding and anchoring in 
other political parties. Another explanation can be the satisfactory economic situation at the 
moment which does not encourage policy action in this area.   
Our parliamentary systems with relatively often shifts of power constellations make 
Ministers as leaders limited both in time and perhaps also in knowledge and experience in 
certain policy areas. The Ministry of Trade and Industry have had 7 Ministers the last 10 
years although one has been minister for two different periods. These rapid changes of 
minister in the Ministry of Trade and Industry can be illuminated in the decision 28.09.06 to 
replace Odd Eriksen with Dag Terje Andersen (Ministry of Trade and Industry, 2006). The 
many recent shifts of minister in the Ministry with the main responsibility for innovation 
policy may have contributed to the failure of the plan. Many informants claimed that this was 
the decisive reason for why both the process and the plan failed. Recent shifts can also 
weaken the position to the minister compared to the other ministers, making it more difficult 
to set the political agenda and become prioritized in the budgetary discussions, which set the 
main frames for further priorities. An informant claimed that the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry is a traditionally week Ministry as it has limited resources compared to other 
ministries which it in this case, is set to coordinate. This does not simplify the situation.  
Another example is the government innovation committee and the government 
innovation forum. The latter only had two meetings and at one of the meetings, the Minister 
of Trade and Industry and the leader of the largest Norwegian labor union, LO got into a 
large discussion and had to leave the meeting. This made the evening headlines and may have 
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contributed to the limited success of these meetings. There have also been several claims that 
if the governments innovation committee had been led by the Prime Minister instead of the 
Minister of Trade and Industry the committee would have got more weight and strength. 
Evidence from for instance the Finnish science and technology council support this claim 
(www.minedu.fi ).  
From my interviews I have got many indicators that it was the week position of the 
Minister of Trade and Industry that contributed to the limited effects of the plan. This may 
have given the bureaucracy more authority to decide on policy and the direction than was 
politically intended. The absence of a strong leader can enhance fragmentation within 
government and fail to unite conflicting interests. The results of policy can therefore differ 
from what was politically intended. Connecting this to the theory of dominant coalitions, a 
week minister will automatically support the dominant coalition in the Ministry. On the other 
hand, a strong minister can change the centre of gravity and shift the division of power and 
future priorities. During my interviews all remarked change both in leadership style and in 
priorities from Gabrielsen to Brende and from Brende to Eriksen, the former labor 
government Minister of Trade and Industry from the Labor Party. This makes leadership an 
important aspect of the process, and the frequent shifts of minister did not benefit the process. 
This has contributed to the current situation for Norwegian innovation policy. 
In the previous sections I have discussed the importance of knowledge, structures, 
history, inertial forces, learning, coalitions and leadership. These are all contributing factors 
to the failure of the action plan for a comprehensive innovation policy. This indicates that the 
reasons for failure are complex and have great influence on each other. In addition to these 
causes I have during my analysis I have found other factors that may have contributed to the 
failure, funding of new policy efforts and the timing of change. These will be discussed in the 
next chapter.  
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5.0 Discussion and Conclusions    
5.1 Budgetary Implications and Learning from History 
As I have written earlier, there were no budgetary commitments attached to the action plan 
when it was presented. The only exceptions were the nine projects that were locally run by 
the different relevant authorities. For all policy efforts that were not already within 
established policy actions, funding had to be found within existing budgetary boundaries. 
This can have reduced the incentive and the possibility for relevant government agencies to 
implement innovation policy changes. This can be explained as a consequence of these 
different factors: 
• Lack of policy learning within the ministries 
• Poor political leadership 
• The strength of internal coalitions 
• Power struggles and internal forces who willingly or unwillingly hold back change  
 
First, we can use the argument of absent policy learning within government. Lack of 
sufficient funding when large changes or readjustments are to be implemented can lead to a 
paralyzing of the organization in question when removing the incentives to change. This can 
also create larger possibilities for internal struggles, and rivaling between different coalitions. 
A recent Norwegian example is the fusion of five research councils into one national research 
council in 1993 (www.forskningsradet.no). At the same time as the new research council 
became operative they experienced large budget cuts and these cuts lasted several years. 
According to the evaluation report in 2001 of the Research Council of Norway, these cuts 
materialized themselves in budget struggles, internal rivaling and micro management from 
the ministries to support their sectoral interests. Because of this, their mission to become a 
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coordinating, integrating council with holistic perspective and actions became a mission 
impossible (Ministry of Education and Research, 2001, p. 7).    
These consequences are in many ways comparable to the results of the work with a 
coherent innovation policy. They were both attempts to implement a holistic, coherent and 
coordinating policy although in different areas and with different means. The most important 
common feature from these processes are the inability to act and change relevant structures. 
The evaluation of the Research Council of Norway was known in both government and in the 
ministries. This indicates a lack of policy learning from prior decisions and actions. This 
reinforces the importance of well functioning systems for continued feedback of knowledge 
into an organization in order to improve policy. The ability to learn is a decisive credential 
for successful governance. This is enhanced by the rapid changes in society following a more 
globalized world. This example of memory loss indicates that something is fundamentally 
wrong with how our government and governance structures are organized.   
This also indicate poor political leadership, with regard to both the absent policy 
learning and the inability to provide sufficient funding. Political leadership is the second area 
I am going to discuss. Informants have indicated that the Minister of Trade and Industry was 
relatively weak in comparison with other ministers. One informant said that there was limited 
interest from ministries not directly involved with the plan. These were not particularly 
interested to increase funding in this area. Others have pointed out that because the Ministry 
of Trade and Industry had a weaker position than the other two main ministries, their role as 
leader and demander of increased funding was undermined. Again we can see the structural 
coordination difficulties when one ministry without the necessary means to set innovation 
policy on the agenda and improve innovation policy, is set to coordinate other who has them. 
This is also an indicator of the fragmented Norwegian government. Although these structures 
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might be beneficial for some purposes, one should also look at the unintended problems they 
cause for other policy areas.   
A third explanation is the particular role of the Ministry of Finance in the Norwegian 
government. It is in a way superior to other ministries as it can control their income and 
revisit their expenses. One informant said that the Ministry of Finance could make other 
ministries change priorities. A consequence of this is that this Ministry becomes the key 
policy maker. However, they also have to follow the common priorities from government and 
this power will therefore be limited. Other informants related the attitudes of the Ministry of 
Finance to the differing views on innovation policy between the more classical economic 
tradition and the evolutionary economics. They share the same perceptions of which 
instruments to use to support innovation as their fellow economics in the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry. One informant said that this can lead to more policy in this direction, which is 
more focus on the general framework conditions and less attention to the direct efforts 
through government agencies as for instance Innovation Norway. Another informant said that 
the common understanding between the dominant coalition of economists in the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry and the Ministry of Finance might contribute to more funding of 
innovation efforts than would have been the case else wise. The process in the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry would ensure that the efforts in question already were approved by 
economists with the same perceptions as in the Ministry of Finance and would therefore 
increase their possibility of being realized.          
However, there is a fourth possible explanation. Each ministry has some liberty to 
rearrange their budgets in order to prioritize other policy areas. In the case of innovation 
policy large efforts in this area could lead to less attention and funding towards other areas. 
One informant said that the ones managing these other projects could be in opposition to new 
potentially rivaling projects in fear of competition for the same resources. Such re-labeling 
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within budgets has according to an informant led to power struggles in-between policy areas 
where in most cases existing policy efforts have won. One informant emphasized that this 
lack of budgetary anchoring can be a way for agents opposing the ideas behind the plan to 
make the proposed policy changes harmless. Both as a new policy area and as a rival to 
established policy areas. This is a way of making policy documents become only words 
instead of action.    
This can be evidence of path dependency and inertia and the dynamics of dominant 
coalitions within ministries. This supports my claim that internal forces, willing or 
unwillingly, can contribute to undermine political and structural changes. Lack of policy 
learning, poor political leadership and fragmentation are also important reasons for why a 
coherent innovation policy failed. These processes were strengthened, or vice versa, by the 
lack of budgetary anchoring of the action plan.    
 
5.2 The Importance of Timing   
Another area I found might have been important for the failure of the plan was the changing 
economic conditions during the period in question. In this section I will discuss: 
• To what degree changes in economic performance influenced the process and 
implementation of the action plan for a comprehensive innovation plan in Norway 
  
When the work with a comprehensive innovation policy was initiated, interest rates were 
high, there were rising unemployment, out- flagging of industry and people were more 
concerned about their jobs and their future. Politicians absorb this and these periods usually 
change focus to industry policy and policies for maintaining a high degree of societys value 
creation. However, this trend shifted during the government election period and removed 
focus in the political debate from industry and future welfare issues to other policy areas. The 
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informants were presented with this claim that shifting conditions in the economy is one 
explanatory factor for why innovation policy failed. I got very different responds to this 
question.  
 Some of the informants claimed that this was a relevant factor and that a worse 
economic situation would have contributed to pushing innovation policy forward both in 
regard to funding and policy. These views were justified by using examples from Finland and 
Sweden, who both had much more severe economic problems than Norway during the 1990s 
(www.minedu.fi ). From this perspective the improvement in our economy made these efforts 
less important both for the direct involved parts and for politicians. This also reinforced the 
views of the economists within the Ministry of Trade and Industry as only the improvement 
of general framework conditions had improved the economic conditions. Other informants 
stressed that an improvement in the economic situation made innovation less important for 
the electorate, the media and i.e. less important for politicians who are dependent continues 
media coverage.  
Other informants oppose this claim because innovation policy was never a policy area 
with public appeal and understanding because it is to complex. Using the electorate and 
media as an excuse for insufficient efforts is therefore difficult. However it can be a reason 
for reduced focus, making the Ministers efforts to raise attention and funding to this area 
more difficult within government.  
An implication of this is that turbulence or a sense of crisis in the economy can make 
necessary policy changes an easier objective as established structures and decision- makers 
feel a greater pressure to change policy and priorities. As an example Finland experienced a 
greater crisis in the economy when government decided to make new and rather successful 
holistic approaches in the innovation policy area (www.minedu.fi ). This indicates that it can 
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be easier to overcome structural barriers to change in times of crisis as forces as inertia, path 
dependency and internal coalitions become more vulnerable and willing to adjust.      
   
5.3 Concluding Remarks  
The causes for a coherent innovation policys failure in Norway are many and complex. 
However, I have during this paper managed to find some indications on the main obstacles 
and reasons why the work with a coherent innovation policy did not achieve its intended 
goals.  
From my previous discussions I have found that the underlying cause for all of these 
reasons is the lack of knowledge about innovation policy that has led to a limited common 
understanding and anchoring of the action plan. This have strengthened negative forces 
within government and made it more difficult for policy-makers to develop and implement a 
comprehensive innovation policy. 
This knowledge deficiency is evident in the different approaches and definitions of 
what innovation policies should contain and where and why they should be executed. The EU 
Innovation Progress Report 2006 has found evidence that although all governments across 
Europe have visions of an innovation policy; they fail to execute one (EU, 2006). This is due 
to a lack of knowledge of what a modern innovation policy imply for policy and 
organizational structures (ibid). This lack of knowledge does not only make it difficult to 
develop an innovation policy, it also make it difficult to anchor common visions, goals and 
efforts in the many people and organizations that have to be a part of a broad innovation 
policy strategy. This is probably the most decisive reason why governments fail to initiate 
and implement innovation policy. 
This argument is consistent with what OECD has pointed out, the knowledge base for 
innovation policy, its contents and implementation is unsatisfactory (OECD, 2005a). 
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Although there are consensuses on the aims of a comprehensive, coherent and horizontal 
innovation policy, European countries achievements in this area is unsatisfactory and 
diverging. The EU is during October 2006 going to host a conference were government 
leaders are to address these challenges more carefully (https://trendchart.cordis.lu/ ). This 
common European problem is in many ways consistent with the Norwegian case in this 
political area. 
Many of the underlying causes for this lack of knowledge have its basis in the 
polarized theoretical debate on the subject. However, with sufficiently rooted visions and 
goals for the process of initiating an innovation policy these differences within a ministry or 
organization could have been overcome. These effects can be reinforced or reduced by the 
leaders ability to pull diverging forces together into a common understanding of policy and 
actions. This is a process that demands much energy, time and will from government. The 
failure of the action plan might be due to an underestimation of the challenges met in the 
process of changing focus and efforts in such a broad and cross- sectoral policy area as 
innovation policy. 
It is also important to consider an organizations history and paths before initiating 
massive changes and not to underestimate internal forces at work. These can, together with 
rigidity and inertia become obstacles to change. However these obstacles will become larger 
if the ambassadors of change do not take them into account and try to include them in the 
process. Forces rooted within these historical positions can have contributed to the failure of 
the action plan by being represented in the dominating coalitions within government and in 
the process of making the entire plan virtually worthless as the chosen efforts were sectoral 
and without budgetary implications. Other contributing factors were the limited attention to 
learning and evaluation mechanisms internally within the ministries. If the ministries had 
taken these more seriously, the knowledge base for the innovation policy plan would have 
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been broader and the plan could have become a real instrument to ensure coherent and 
horizontal policies. Failure from political leaders when neglecting the need for funding in this 
new policy area also contributed to its poor results. This was reinforced by the positive 
changes in the economic outlooks, but the mentioned causes above would not alone have 
been a sufficient cause for the failure of developing and implementing a comprehensive 
innovation policy in Norway.  At the basis of all these explanations is the knowledge 
argument, i.e. that the common understanding of what a comprehensive innovation policy 
should imply was absent in the process.  
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6.0 Policy Implications and Suggestions for Further Research 
6.1 Policy Implications 
From my analysis I can draw some policy implications to avoid pitfalls when developing a 
coherent, coordinated and horizontal policy. There is a need to develop broad knowledge 
bases for new policy areas, especially when they are crossing traditional boundaries. For this 
to be possible, learning and evaluation systems within organizations have to be dynamic and 
well- functioning. This will contribute to both strengthen the knowledge bases as well as 
creating a friendlier environment for change. The implementation of new policy areas 
demands long- term, strong and visionary leadership in order to make these changes. This 
will contribute to reduce underlying tensions within an organization; alternative ways of 
organizing can contribute to reduce such tensions. It is also important that decision- makers 
provide leaders and organizations with the sufficient means to make necessary changes.         
 
6.2 Suggestions for Further research 
As innovation policy is an area of practice, not a theoretical area, further research should 
contain further national investigations of the mechanisms supporting changes in the political 
system contributing to a nations innovative capability. This should be used to explore 
alternative ways of organizing both bureaucracy and innovation policy. There is also a need 
for further research on why bureaucracy has difficulties with changing their policies and 
practices to make necessary adaptations to their changing environment. This research should 
suggest alternative ways of organizing for governments in order to improve policy.   
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Appendix 1 
Interview Guide 
 
 
Personal information: 
 
1) Academic and professional background  
2) How were you involved in the process and the implementation of the action plan?  
3) How do you define innovation policy? Is this coherent with the action plan?  
 
Work related questions 
1) Relationship between your workplace and the ministries? 
 Is contact dependent on personal acquaintances?  
 How often do you have contact, formal/ informal? 
 Is this contact sufficient for your organization? 
2) What is the use of this relationship for your organization? 
3) Are you able to influence decisions? Is there an active dialogue?  
Give examples. 
 
The degree of change 
1) Name the most important changes in innovation policy from the action plan 
2) To what degree do these changes represent novelty/ degree of change?   
Give examples  
3) What is the greatest barrier to implementing a comprehensive innovation policy? 
   
Causes 
1) Are there signs of structural rigidity within the ministries? How? 
2) Is it difficult to change focus within policy areas?  
Give examples  
 
3) How did the improvement in the economic situation influence the process 
 
4) Which signals did you receive from the Ministers? 
5) Did these changes following the change in Minister in the Ministry of Trade and 
Development? 
6) How do the three Ministers differ in the innovation policy area? 
 
7) To what degree is learning and learning processes an important part of government work? 
8) Are the ministries good at implementing knowledge from learning activities? 
Give examples 
 
Special questions to employees in the Ministry of Trade and Development  
 
1) Are there different coalitions within this organization? Who? Does this cause tensions? 
2) Which economic theory is dominating? 
3) How much can the minister influence policy efforts? 
4) How do you work (working methods as for example rotation, decentralized structure, 
learning routines?) 
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5) Have these improved following the action plan? 
6) How do you work with the organizational goals at this moment? 
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Appendix 2 
 
List of Interviewees 
 
Anthony Kallevig, LO, Labor Union  
Bjørn Haugstad, former State Secretary, Ministry of Education and Research 
Carl Huitfeldt, Ministry of Trade and Industry 
Erland Skogli, NHO, Norwegian Confederation of Enterprises   
Helle Hammer, former State Secretary, Ministry of Trade and Industry 
Jan Johan Sandal, Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development  
Jon Hekland, Research Council of Norway 
Jon Kveine, Innovation Norway 
Kjerstin Spjøtvoll, Ministry of Trade and Industry 
Morten Meyer, former State Secretary, Ministry of Local Government and Regional 
Development  
Roar Tobro, Innovation Norway 
Tor- Ivar Wammer, Ministry of Trade and Industry 
Tor Jørgen Thoresen, Research Council of Norway  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
